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Abstract 
In its drive to prevent market failures and safeguard consumers, the European 
legislator has embraced the information approach. In the context of online trade, this 
requires online traders to disclose ever-growing amounts of information to consumers 
regarding contract terms, the handling of their personal information, and the use of 
cookies on the trader’s website, to name just a few of the areas involved. However, 
whilst adopting substantive information obligations for traders, the European 
legislator still tends to disregard scholarship on effective information design. This 
paper recommends empirically tested, interdisciplinary criteria for the design of 
effective disclosures online, with a focus on their application in the EU. Without clear 
guidance as to how disclosures should be formulated, traders are left open to 
accidental or purposeful obfuscation. 
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1. The Problem with (Studying) Online Disclosures 
 
The omnipresence of disclosures in modern internet users’ daily lives is rivalled only 
by said users’ distaste for acknowledging and reading them (e.g., Milne and Culnan 
2004). Although “‘empowering’ consumers through information has become a 
singularly important element in the regulatory toolbox” (Helberger 2011, p. 337), this 
“empowerment” has had difficulty in moving out of the quotation marks and into 
reality. Consumers have many reasons to avoid reading contract terms, cookie 
policies, or privacy statements: they may find the texts inaccessible (Bakos et al. 
2014), lack the financial literacy to fully comprehend the terms (Mak 2012), take 
shortcuts to avoid reading the lengthy texts, such as to look for a TRUSTe seal 
(Furnell and Phippen 2012), or automatically equate an online trader’s good 
reputation with their commitment to providing fair terms (Harridge-March 2006). A 
further group have little faith in disclosures at all, choose not to read them, and share 
as little personal data as possible in order to avoid privacy-related risks (Park et al. 
2012). Collectively, these obstacles seem to spell out the failure of information 
obligations altogether (Ben-Shahar and Schneider 2014a, 2014b), particularly in the 
online sector where transaction trust, convenience, and speed are essential to market 
success (Milne and Culnan 2004) and where the European Digital Single Market 
continues to underperform (Helberger 2013; Plesea Doru et al. 2014).  
Many of the drawbacks of information obligations have been identified in the 
offline context (see, for example, Ben-Shahar and Schneider 2014a, 2014b). 
Unfortunately, the European legislator has not yet tried to remedy them in the new, 
digital transaction environment, i.e., in the setting where consumer-facing information 
is even more direly needed to serve consumer protection and transaction trust. This 
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paper proposes an expansion of the disciplinary and methodological pool at the 
disposal of policymakers in order to optimize information design for the digital 
market (see Figure 1). Considering the legislative focus of the European legislator on 
the Digital Single Market and their intention to ensure that existing principles and 
consumer protection mechanisms continue to be fit for purpose (European 
Commission 2017a), it is crucial to consider how information design and the principle 
of transparency could be adjusted to account for the advantages of the online 
environment.  
 
Figure 1 Domains of scholarship that inform disclosure design in European Union 
consumer law 
 
 
Note: We propose a multidisciplinary extension of the empirical basis, which informs 
EU policymaking with regard to the design of online disclosures. To date, research in 
the fields of behavioural economics and qualitative consumer surveys has played a 
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relatively limited role in the creation and subsequent evaluation of online disclosure, 
and studies in the two domains have occurred largely in mutual isolation (“status 
quo”). Our proposal adds three more fields to the empirical basis, namely critical 
linguistics, communication science, and neuroscience. Moreover, we argue for the 
consistent and comprehensive use of this multidisciplinary combination 
(“enhancement”), with a firm focus on clear and effective communication and on 
knowledge transfer between all five now-overlapping domains.  
  
The multidisciplinary approach distinguishes this work from previous attempts 
to guide legislators, which mainly analysed insights taken from the science of 
behavioural economics (Oehler and Wendt 2017).1 Our approach also responds to 
Helberger’s (2013) sobering call for smart information reduction and disclosure 
personalisation by striving for a systematic, empirically framed view of standard 
information presentation, perception, and processing in the online context, since 
“what works in print may not work online,” as Hogarth and Merry’s (2011, p. 2) study 
of financial disclosures ascertains. Nowadays, the EU is increasingly open to 
incorporating behavioural study outcomes into policy, as Helleringer and Sibony 
(2017, pp. 645-646) conclude and Lurger (2017) encourages. We argue for an even 
wider scope of relevant research disciplines to support optimized legislation 
development.  The paper takes a first step in that direction with a review and 
assessment of the disciplines and methodologies that should be used to achieve this 
purpose.  
                                                        
1 For a more extensive overview of behavioural economics’ current application in EU 
legislation as well as its potential for the future, see, e.g., Helleringer and Sibony 
(2017) and Purnhagen (2015). 
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This effort begins with an overview of the legal background of select European 
information obligations most relevant to business-to-consumer (B2C) online 
transactions for the purchase of consumer products and services. This includes an 
analysis of the supposed effectiveness, robustness, and the ease of adoption and 
application of mandatory information obligations in both their past offline and present 
online form. The paper then turns to empirical work in communication science, 
document design, and neuroscience – research fields selected to offer a novel, data-
centred, interdisciplinary view on the effective regulation of the presentation (i.e., 
design and contextual requirements) of large volumes of information online. Finally, 
the paper focuses on the specific methodologies and research designs that have most 
often been used in empirical inquiry into transparent and effective online 
communication.  
 
2. The Origins and Pitfalls of Information Obligations 
Before diving into the details of the transparency and the operationalization of online 
provision of mandatory consumer information, it is pertinent to consider its origins as 
well as the politics and aspirations associated with this instrument. The variety of 
mandatory disclosures in European consumer law, which may require different online 
content and, to an extent, different online design, prevents us from addressing them 
all. Therefore, in this section, we mention the mandatory information obligations most 
relevant to the online purchase of consumer products and services, as regulated by 
European consumer law.  
Although their application yields variable results, information obligations 
enjoy high popularity in national and supranational legislatures and often tend to 
expand (Grundmann 2002; Helberger 2013; Helleringer and Sibony 2017; Howells 
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2005; Nordhausen Scholes 2009), thanks to the following purported characteristics: 
Disclosure is effective, widely supported across party lines, and costs almost nothing 
to implement and enforce, since the costs of these activities usually land onto third 
parties (see also Ben-Shahar and Schneider 2014b; Franck and Purnhagen 2013). 
Through a short introduction, we consider each of these characteristics in light of the 
role they play in the current state of the art of online disclosure and its future 
salvation.   
 
2.1. Content and Design of Information Obligations in EU Consumer Law  
 
One of the objectives behind the introduction of mandatory information obligations in 
European consumer law was to restore contractual balance between consumers and 
traders (Helberger 2013; Luth and Cseres 2010; Tscherner 2014). Consumers suffer 
transactional disadvantage (Helleringer and Sibony 2017) when compared to traders, 
with regard to both the amount of information they possess as well as the resources 
they have to gather and process such information (Nordhausen Scholes 2009). The 
traders’ obligation to provide specific information to consumers, therefore, aims to 
bring consumers to better, informed decisions (Grynbaum 2010; Helberger 2013; 
Nordhausen Scholes 2009), as well as to secure their rights by documenting them 
(Luzak 2005; Mankowski 2005) and making them readily identifiable in case of post-
contractual disputes.  
It is important to recall that mandatory information duties were part of various 
European consumer protection measures2 prior to the increase in popularity of online 
                                                        
2 See, e.g., Council Directive of 13 June 1990 on package travel, package holidays and 
package tours (90/314/EEC) OJ L 158/59 (Package Travel Directive) or Directive 
97/7/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 1997 on the 
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transactions and before the European legislator defined the average consumer as a 
circumspect and well-informed actor in the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive.3 
This legislative development followed long-standing Court of Justice of the European 
Union (CJEU) case law on misleading commercial practices, which postulates that 
average consumers are not easily misled.4 The adoption of this benchmark suggests 
that, for example, a trader’s omission of material information should not easily 
influence average consumers’ decision-making because they would already be well-
informed. Two remarks need to be made in this respect. First, it is questionable 
whether the notion of an average consumer should serve as a benchmark for consumer 
protection in all European consumer law or only with regards to establishing the 
fairness of commercial practices, and potentially of contract terms (Duivenvoorde 
2015; Mak 2011).5 Second, recent studies on European consumer law acknowledge 
the increasing need to protect vulnerable consumers and to broaden the scope of the 
notion of vulnerability (Domurath 2017; European Commission 2016; Schebesta and 
Purnhagen 2016).6 Therefore, policymakers should continue working to remedy the 
information imbalance, and the overall effort to increase the effectiveness of 
mandatory information obligations remains as relevant as ever. 
Due to the European legislator’s strong tendency to regulate very specific 
transactions, some scholars characterize information obligations as piecemeal (e.g., 
                                                                                                                                                               
protection of consumers in respect of distance contracts OJ L 144/19 (Distance 
Selling Directive). 
3 Directive 2005/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 May 
2005 concerning unfair business-to-consumer commercial practices in the 
internal market OJ L 149/22 (Unfair Commercial Practices Directive). 
4 See, e.g., CJEU, case C-210/96 (Gut Springenheide) ECLI:EU:C:1998:369 para 37. 
5 CJEU has started to apply the benchmark of an average consumer in cases assessing 
fairness of standard terms and conditions. See, e.g., CJEU, case C-26/13 (Kásler) 
ECLI:EU:C:2014:282. 
6 For a more extensive account of the information paradigm in European law and its 
behavioural turn, see Franck and Purnhagen (2013). 
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Schulte-Nölke 2005; Rinkes 2006). The oldest directives, such as the Doorstep Selling 
Directive from 1985,7 did not contain such duties – although policymakers had been 
discussing information asymmetry problems since the 1970s (European Economic 
Community 1975). Conversely, as of the 1990s information obligations became a 
standard part of drafting European consumer protection measures and found their way 
into such legal acts as the Package Travel Directive and the Distance Selling 
Directive, alongside a multitude of other consumer protection measures, including, 
most recently, the Consumer Rights Directive (the CRD).8 
Despite overall criticism as to the effectiveness of information obligations (e.g., 
Ben-Shahar and Schneider 2014a), policymakers seem unwilling to forego their use. 
The recent adoption of the CRD confirms this, as it notably increases the number of 
mandatory information obligations online traders face (Lurger 2017; Luzak and Mak 
2014). One of the explanations may be found in the generally shared view that the 
adoption of information obligations for traders is a measure that intrudes upon the 
freedom of the marketplace and party autonomy only to a small extent (Grundmann 
2002).  
We may expect a certain overlap between the content of mandatory information 
obligations for traders and service providers in various areas, even if they are 
regulated by different European provisions. For example, both an online credit 
provider and an online seller of cosmetics should reveal their name and address, 
                                                        
7 Council Directive of 20 Dececmber 1985 to protect the consumer in respect of 
contracts negotiated away from business premises (85/577/EEC) OJ L 372/31 
(Doorstep Selling Directive). 
8 Directive 2011/83/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 
2011 on consumer rights OJ L 304/64 (Consumer Rights Directive). 
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respectively pursuant to Article 5 Consumer Credit Directive (the CCD)9 and Article 6 
CRD. At the same time, some information obligations will be area-specific, such as 
those concerning the annual percentage rate (or APR), one of the main characteristics 
of consumer credit contracts. The European legislator could simplify its regulation 
and avoid such an overlap by further harmonizing information content (Lurger 2017). 
This has not occurred on the European level yet. For instance, whilst Article 6 CRD 
requires online traders to inform consumers of the main characteristics of a product or 
a service they are purchasing, it excludes consumer credit contracts from its 
application.  
Similarly, the requirements for information design, including transparency, have 
not yet been harmonized. In some areas of consumer law, CRD included, 
policymakers operationalize the requirement of information transparency in unhelpful 
general descriptions, such as mandating traders to use “clear and comprehensible” 
language, without additional elaboration, attention to context, or examples (for further 
discussion, see Helleringer and Sibony 2017). In other sectors, e.g., food or energy,10 
specific information design is prescribed to guarantee the transparency of some salient 
consumer information. Edinger (2016) even postulates that current regulations on 
food information have reached “maturity” (i.e., efficiency and efficacy) and seem to 
facilitate improved consumer choices. Finally, the above-mentioned CCD combines 
both approaches, standardizing certain consumer credit information in its Annex II, 
whilst allowing credit providers to display other information more freely, e.g., in the 
                                                        
9 Directive 2008/48/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 
2008 on credit agreements for consumers OJ L 133/66 (Consumer Credit 
Directive). 
10 See, e.g., Regulation 1169/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
25 October 2011 on the provision of food information to consumers OJ L 304/18. 
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advertising stage, “prominently,” “concisely,” and “clearly,” pursuant to Article 4 
CCD. 
Despite a few areas of consumer protection where the European legislator 
prescribes particular information content or design, the general information 
obligations applicable to most online traders on the basis of the CRD lack specific 
guidance. This allows online traders to blur the lines between the provision of 
mandatory information and their own disclaimers, which increases the amount of 
information consumers have to read. Traders are also relatively free to provide such 
information in various forms and contexts. In this paper, we argue that, as long as 
information obligations remain an important part of the European legislator’s toolbox, 
more attention should be given to increasing their effectiveness and minimizing their 
cost by guiding traders more closely. This can be achieved by adopting an 
interdisciplinary methodology (Lurger 2017) that we outline in Section 3 and beyond, 
to determine the best practices of online provision of mandatory consumer 
information, utilizing the advantages of the online environment. Since our argument 
aims to convince EU policymakers that (re-)consideration of information design could 
improve the effectiveness of information obligations, it is necessary to address the 
purported effectiveness of such duties first.  
 
2.2. Supposedly Effective Consumer Protection Mechanism 
 
The first thing we need to know about information obligations is that they are 
supposedly effective. They are an information solution to an information problem 
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(e.g., Helberger 2013; Marotta-Wurgler 2012).11 The EU has embraced the 
information paradigm and tied it to the achievement of ambitious goals such as 
creating a more vibrant e-commerce market (e.g., Kroes 2012), protecting consumers 
equally across the continent (e.g., Reich and Micklitz 2014), and fostering more 
vibrant trade relations overall. The trouble with the supposed effectiveness of 
information obligations is that it is rarely questioned or tested, recent Commission-
sponsored studies as well as academic research in some specific areas notwithstanding 
(see, for example, Van Herpen and Van Trijp 2014, Edinger 2016 or Van Kleef et al. 
2008 for nutrition labelling effects;  Helleringer 2016 and Sah and Loewenstein 2014 
for the assessment of mandatory and voluntary disclosure of conflicts of interest in 
consumer finance). This pertains especially to the assumptions of what would 
guarantee transparency and effective provision of online information, as the European 
legislator rarely applies specific information designs and has not yet accounted for the 
opportunities that the online environment provides. Therefore, one of the first steps 
towards improving online disclosures is to ground them in empirical findings, based 
on methodologically sound, multidisciplinary research with information transparency 
as its main objective. Section 4 provides our recommendations as to disciplines that 
should be employed in improving online information design in the EU. 
 
2.3. Robust Consumer Protection Mechanism  
 
                                                        
11  We are focusing in this paper on the function of information obligations as a 
consumer protection mechanism rather than a purported silver bullet against 
market failures and a mechanism, which assigns information responsibilities and 
analytical competences to different stakeholders (for further reading on this point, 
see Franck and Purnhagen 2013). 
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The assumption that information obligations are effective has contributed predictably 
to their rapid expansion, so much so that Ben-Shahar and Schneider (2014a, p. 211) 
call this phenomenon “the disclosure ratchet”. Like the one-way tool, information 
obligations do not roll backwards. Effective information obligations expand to cover 
even more ground, while ineffective ones keep growing in order to reach their 
undoubted potential. Again, what is at fault here is the failure either to carry out 
empirical research or to integrate its findings into concrete policy guiding the design 
and implementation of information obligations. Such research could either assess 
which type of content diminishes information asymmetry in practice or whether and 
how information design insights could simplify disclosures. Currently, because 
disclosures are considered to be a panacea, increasing their dosage can only do good. 
The EU is guilty of this approach as much as any other legislative body. In its view, 
“more information is always better for consumers,” as Helleringer and Sibony (2017, 
p. 622) remark. 
A recent example thereof is the adoption of the CRD, which overwhelms online 
traders with the obligation to disclose at least twenty different pieces of information 
(Luzak and Mak 2014; Nordhausen Scholes 2009). The CRD repealed the Distance 
Selling Directive, which listed significantly fewer such obligations for online traders, 
namely nine. Consequently, the traders’ burden regarding the online provision of 
information to consumers has increased substantially. The justification for this change 
did not come from empirical evidence confirming the benefit of providing even more 
mandatory information to consumers. On the contrary, studies from the United States, 
evaluating similar legislative proposals to expand mandatory disclosures, indicated 
the inefficiency of such amendments (e.g., Marotta-Wurgler 2011).  
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Instead of commissioning empirical studies on this matter, the European 
legislator took online traders’ interests into consideration and drafted the mandatory 
information obligations of the CRD to be exhaustive, i.e., barring Member States from 
adding further information obligations. Although harmonization on the European 
level extended the list of information obligations, cross-border traders were still 
supposed to benefit from lower compliance costs thanks to uniformity (European 
Commission 2017b). Unfortunately, the European legislator, endangering its own 
agenda, left a window open in Article 6 para 8 CRD, which still could lead to an 
extension of information requirements. 
The tendency towards expansion of information obligations also exacerbates 
disclosure fatigue, which is already widespread and diminishes whatever positive 
effects a particular information obligation may produce (Helberger 2013). Here, too, 
empirical studies on both traders and consumers have shown that, on average, less is 
more (as shown in, e.g., Elshout et al. 2016; Hogarth and Merry 2011) and that the 
best way for information obligations to serve their purpose is to keep them in check. 
Further studies could assess the effectiveness of particular online disclosures, as well 
as how online information design could counteract disclosure fatigue. Our 
recommendations in Section 5 address these issues as well. 
 
2.4. Easily Adopted Consumer Protection Mechanism 
 
Both mandatory information obligations and the principle of transparency are well-
established in European consumer law as mechanisms of consumer protection. One of 
the reasons the EU has taken to mandatory information obligations is because this 
mechanism has universal political appeal. On the other side of the Atlantic, United 
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States legislators habitually unite in (almost) unanimous drives to introduce and 
expand mandatory disclosures (e.g., Marotta-Wurgler 2011). Fighting market failure 
with information is the most acceptable solution for the two dominant political 
doctrines: “[Mandated disclosure] does not offend and generally appeals to the two 
fundamental political ideologies, the free-market principle, laissez-faire, and 
deregulation on one hand and the autonomy principle, consumer protection, and 
human empowerment on the other” (Ben-Shahar and Schneider 2014a, p. 208). Good 
intentions and overwhelming support might, therefore, also cloud the judgment of 
European legislators and lead them to dive headlong into introducing information 
obligations as an easy fix.  
Additionally, the recent experience with the adoption of the CRD demonstrated 
that the drafting of information obligations is not the most controversial part of the 
legislative process. Despite the process itself stretching over three years, the European 
legislators’ uncertainty revolved mostly around the further harmonization of measures 
against unfair contract terms. In other words, the legislators’ opinions differed 
predominantly on the character of information obligations’ harmonization – minimum 
or full – rather than on questioning their overall raison d’être or scope (e.g., 
Grundmann 2013; Weatherill 2012). 
Therefore, we do not expect our recommendations for further harmonization of 
online information design to stir competence questions in EU law. We aim to improve 
the effectiveness of already existing measures rather than create new ones; especially 
since further regulation of information design has already taken place in particular 
areas of European consumer law (see, e.g., Heinzle and Wüstenhagen 2012; Van 
Kleef et al. 2007). In contrast to the existing standardized measures, we suggest 
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exploiting the advantages of the online environment to improve the effectiveness of 
information design across European consumer law. 
 
2.5. Easily Applied Consumer Protection Mechanism 
 
The final ace up the sleeve of information obligations is their low cost. They require 
only minimal bureaucratic effort on the part of governments and regulators, whilst 
traders carry the burden of compliance and implementation (e.g., Ben-Shahar and 
Schneider 2014a, 2014b). In the context of the EU, the costs of regulation are even 
more diffuse since enforcement and litigation usually remain on the Member-State 
level (Garcia Porras and van Boom 2012). Hence, online traders find themselves in an 
ambivalent and seemingly disadvantageous position. On the one hand, they are meant 
to bear the costs of drafting transparent (pre-)contractual information; on the other, 
they have little incentive to do so because enforcement is lax and crafting truly 
informative disclosure is costly. Therefore, they typically choose to pass the high 
information costs on to consumers in the form of legally sound yet unintelligible 
online disclosures. Research on consumer trust in e-commerce (e.g., Milne and 
Culnan 2004; Plesea Doru et al. 2014) suggests that consumers tend to be put off by 
information that is difficult to read. Arguably, online traders make a poor trade-off by 
saving costs but losing consumer trust as a result thereof.  
As discussed already, the compliance costs resulting from the CRD’s increased 
information requirements were meant to be offset through the advantages of 
maximum harmonization (European Commission 2017b). During the European 
Consumer Summit 2016, it was reported that 60 per cent of traders considered 
information obligations beneficial, but the same amount also recognized that 
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compliance costs have increased (Centre for Strategy and Evaluation Services 2016). 
Such additional costs would likely be passed on to consumers (OECD 2007). 
Any future overhaul of information obligations, therefore, will require careful 
consideration of actors’ costs (Ben-Shahar and Schneider 2014b) and a re-design that 
affords online traders reliable and easy compliance and simultaneously lightens the 
consumers’ burden. This is where both empirical research that goes beyond 
behavioural economics, as we argue below, and political science should step in and 
provide collaborative insights for the design of smart legislation that can keep the 
costs of mandatory information obligations for legislators low, without overburdening 
online traders and consumers. 
 
2.6. Response to Critiques of Mandatory Information Obligations 
 
Among the sobering studies on the subject, Ben-Shahar and Schneider (2014a, 2014b) 
offer one of the most systematic reviews of the apparent failure of mandated 
disclosure. They cite a wealth of examples from extant US-American legislation, 
standard forms that have grown far beyond their usefulness, and real-life situations 
that illustrate the numerous pitfalls and contextual dependencies of what can be 
considered transparent disclosure. Hogarth and Merry (2011) review the results of 
rigorous consumer tests by the Federal Reserve Board and reveal disclosures’ 
unreliable yield in the field of personal finance, with no clear solutions in sight.  
Specifically in the online context, many other authors have already proclaimed 
online disclosure inadequate when it comes to engaging and educating consumers in 
order to correct market imbalances (Ayres and Schwartz, 2014; Bakos et al. 2014; 
Bar-Gill et al. 2017; Bar-Gill and Board 2012; Howells 2005; Lee at al. 2017; 
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Marotta-Wurgler 2012; Seira et al. 2017). Some even view contemporary online 
disclosures as mere compliance instruments that safeguard companies from possible 
legal action and, thus, were never seriously meant to educate consumers (Furnell and 
Phippen 2012).  
Yet other scholars (see, for example, Willis 2008) are ready to abandon 
information obligations altogether and instead propose consumer protection measures 
whose success does not hinge on customer knowledge at all. Studies on cognitive 
biases and individual consumer variations when it comes to reading and implementing 
disclosures, such as Bertrand and Morse (2011), raise the question whether 
standardization can ever work. Consequently, authors like Faure and Luth (2011) 
advocate for a shift of focus from information obligations to more substantive policy 
intervention to remedy market failures.  
This paper follows the realistic assumption that mandated disclosure is here to 
stay and, therefore, empirical and theoretical efforts on the subject, which demonstrate 
it requires an intervention, should be considered further. If we were to narrow the 
original problem of (studying) the instrument down to a single point, it would be the 
deficiencies of empiricism involved in both designing online disclosure guidelines 
and studying how businesses implement, and customers perceive, the resulting texts. 
For example, after the last revision of the ePrivacy Directive, there was no European 
norm on how internet service providers should convey to internet users, who often are 
end consumers, mandatory information on the gathering and processing of their 
personal data. National policymakers struggled to implement this directive properly, 
and only some national authorities issued more specific guidelines on this matter, such 
as in the UK (Luzak 2014). Even those clearer and more specific guidelines still did 
not stem from rigorous academic research.  
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Critique notwithstanding, some progress is also evident. For instance, the 
European Commission’s Consumers, Health, Agriculture and Food Executive Agency 
(CHAFEA) sponsored a study of consumers’ attitudes towards and interactions with 
contract terms and conditions online (Elshout et al. 2016). It came on the heels of 
other consumer research initiatives, most of which fall under the umbrella of 
behavioural economics and focus on the impact of offline and online information on 
consumer choices in healthcare (Alemanno 2015; CHAFEA 2014), personal banking 
(TNS 2012), retail investment (Chater et al. 2010), food shopping (EATWELL 2013; 
Himmelsbach et al. 2014), the telecommunication market (Lurger 2017; Lurger et al. 
2016) and sustainability-related behaviours (Heinzle and Wüstenhagen 2012; 
Leenheer et al. 2014), to name a few important avenues. A consortium headed by The 
Gallup Organization offers a comprehensive test of a standardized information notice 
on the now-defunct Common European Sales Law (Gallup Consortium 2013; see also 
Riesenhuber 2013; Wulf 2016). Hence, the European Commission is growing 
increasingly aware of the need to get into the nuts and bolts of policy implementation 
in practice. 
 
3. Guiding Questions and Disciplinary Synergies 
 
The above overview paints a general picture of well-intentioned regulation that is 
determined to follow the path of information obligations, with varying emphasis on 
the details of implementation and only sporadic empirical grounding. Despite recent 
moves towards greater empiricism, particularly in the field of transparent food and 
energy labelling, the old habits remain deeply entrenched in legislative and regulative 
practice. We are particularly concerned about the shortage of implementation guides, 
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which could further improve the information design, contributing to the increased 
effectiveness of information obligations. This lack is further exacerbated by the 
European Commission’s traditional avoidance of head-on clashes with any one 
Member State’s national legislation (e.g., Faust 2016; Nordhausen 2004). Thus, 
regulation at best communicates the spirit of a particular rule, delegating its 
implementation to national bodies. Still, it is feasible to imagine that European 
regulators could provide concrete examples and more explicit guidance without 
stepping on any Member State’s toes. The field of nutritional and energy labelling 
may serve as an example here. National regulators might, in turn, welcome such 
guidance, limiting their need to fill in the gaps or clarify any uncertainties.   
With regard to the focus of our research, we propose that the regulation of 
information obligations would improve if policymakers issued guidelines specifying 
how to achieve transparency in online contract terms. As we have mentioned above, 
currently, policymakers mostly use general terms to set requirements of transparency, 
such as mandating traders to use “clear and comprehensible” language. A few 
regulatory exceptions that provide for a specific information design, such as 
nutritional or energy labels, usually only correspond to singular information needs of 
consumers. Moreover, these specific information designs do not utilize the advantages 
of the online environment, as they are applicable in both offline and online contexts.  
As a starting point to our interdisciplinary review, we pursue the general 
question of when information presented to a consumer by an online trader can be 
considered transparent, as demonstrated by empirical research. More specifically, we 
cover content as well as presentation issues and provide insights into how vocabulary, 
phrasing, text length, document design, presentation medium and device employed 
can and do affect the reading and understanding of information disclosures. Based on 
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a review of the literature, we draw clear-cut plans for concrete and targeted further 
research with a view to substantiating the insights presented here. Results of such 
further research should lead to the formulation of specific, actionable guidelines for 
improving provision of mandatory information online on the EU level. 
The following section also highlights the emphasis we place on synergies and 
dialogue between legal scholarship, policy analysis, and empirical research. Online 
consumers are best served by accessible and specific (pre-)contractual information. 
This requires the use of copywriting, formatting and web design, which are the 
domains of linguistics and communication science. Consumers often decide whether it 
is worthwhile reading online contract terms, and how much attention to pay to them, 
based on their presentation (Waller 2017). These choices are better understood with 
the help of cognitive psychology and behavioural economics. When it comes to 
reading complex texts such as standard terms and conditions, people often need 
attention guides and specific patterns of content organization in order to stay on track 
and get as much information out of a text as possible (Holsanova 2012). Eye-tracking 
research and neuroscience provide pertinent insights into such aids to understanding. 
Finally, the EU vision of an “average consumer” (Duivenvoorde 2015; Trzaskowski 
2011) and harmonized legislation (Reich and Micklitz 2014) notwithstanding, 
consumers, traders, and regulators are individuals who experience disclosures in 
unique ways. While we do not advocate for any level of personalizing disclosure 
mandates, ethnographic methods such as semi-structured interviews and sociological 
methods like online surveys are essential for gathering rich insights into individual 
thought processes, which can then inform educational examples and improve 
implementation guides. In other words, they would help the EU “listen to its people” 
(Purnhagen 2015, p. 51). The following section discusses each of these research 
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approaches in detail. Our intention is to chart a research path toward integrating the 
expected insights into a new and improved set of guidelines on provision of 
information to consumers that could be implemented across the EU. 
 
4. Empirical Insights 
 
As discussed above, there are a few disciplines that can inform the debate on 
improving information duties. Whilst we do not claim that we have exhausted the 
vault of research related to the provision of information in all disciplines, the 
empirical findings and principles from human communication research presented 
below could be recommended to policymakers interested in drafting effective 
information obligations based on empirical findings, rather than on blind faith that 
presenting troves of information with little concrete guidance could work.  
 
4.1. Communication Science and Information Design 
 
Communication science has put a lot of effort into studying the patterns and notions 
of effective information design, focussing especially on online media due to their 
ever-growing relevance. Ground-laying work on the conceptualization of online 
communication (e.g., Walther 1996) suggests that due to the internet’s inclusiveness, 
accessibility and interactivity it not only mediates but also modifies and directs the 
communication processes it hosts. The profound effects of the online communication 
environment, therefore, need to be considered carefully in the evaluation and 
improvement of online information duties. 
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The first area in which communication studies can help is content presentation, 
i.e., layout. Whilst the term is usually associated with print media, Waller (2017) 
makes a strong case for its role as a strong determinant of communicative outcomes in 
web pages as well. The author identifies layout as “a major infrastructure for reading 
and writing in an age when few make time to engage with long linear texts” (Waller 
2017, p. 177). Citing the print and online front pages of The Guardian as an example, 
he bemoans the loss of cohesion, hierarchy and multimodal metaphor that occurs 
when a story moves from print to web. It is not only expressive potentials (meaning 
the text’s structural and content-based means of transmitting information) that are lost 
when the layout of a text is removed. The lack of attention guides (Holsanova 2012) 
and other visual signposts makes it more difficult for readers to stay focused on the 
page and follow the path to reading and understanding the complex text before them. 
Subheadings and different fonts and colours for especially important information are 
used reasonably often at present, but additional research indicates that graphical 
(Panzarasa et al. 2016) and tabular (Mayer 2002) representation or summation of 
information greatly enhance understanding and retention, allowing for multimodal 
information transfer (e.g., Bateman 2017) and more effective communication. Such 
multimodal enhancement of complex disclosure texts could be operationalized in a 
number of ways that would neither dilute the legal meaning nor strain the web design: 
from a smart text-box design enhanced with attention-guiding arrows which connect 
relevant sections as the reader goes through the text, to an automatically scrolling 
page with a dynamic gaze guide, the possibilities for enhancing reading 
comprehension and text sequentiality are endless. Their empirically determined 
usefulness is the only real constraint of relevance here.  
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Effective communication can also make better use of online media’s well-
established core affordances. One of the internet’s most distinct features is the 
hyperlinking of content. This affords web authors the unique opportunity to link 
related concepts and build semantic networks. Djonov (2005; 2007) has researched 
the structure and effects of hyperlinked web content and concludes that hyperlinking 
within a document enhances learning and conceptual thinking in adolescents. This 
finding can readily be applied to online disclosures, using the hyperlinking of major 
concepts to allow readers quick access to terms and passages of interest. Such an 
application might seem at odds with European case law. In case C-49/11, Content 
Services Ltd v Bundesarbeitskammer the CJEU ruled against the provision of 
pertinent contract information via hyperlink and deemed that the practice violates 
Article 5 Distance Selling Directive. Namely, in the given case consumers would need 
to click on a hyperlink to access mandatory information, which traders should have 
given to them.  
Consequently, an inactive or unaware consumer, who would not click on the 
hyperlink, could miss important transactional information. Hyperlinks can indeed 
“hide” pertinent information, but they can also emphasize, elucidate, and interconnect 
it, as communication research has demonstrated. As a result, it could be argued that 
the use of hyperlinks to provide any less relevant information, e.g., information that is 
not mandatory, could benefit consumers as it would shorten disclosures on the main 
website. Whether mandatory information could be disclosed to consumers through the 
use of hyperlinks is more debatable, as it is likely consumers’ attention would need to 
be explicitly drawn to such hyperlinks, taking away any doubt about the traders’ 
intention to hide this information.  
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Interestingly, research sponsored by the Commission has made the case for 
incorporating more detailed information accessible via mouse click and displayed in 
pop-ups or drop-downs (CHAFEA 2014). The difference between such mouse clicks, 
pop-ups or drop-downs as opposed to hyperlinks is that the former may be activated 
without specific action on the part of the consumer, which still allows passive 
consumers to obtain necessary information. Harnessing hyperlinks’ navigation and 
semantic-structure potentials, alongside the already recommended mouse clicks, pop-
ups and drop-downs, appears to be a fruitful path to pursue. 
This addition would seem especially relevant in light of research showing that 
hyperlinking also enables readers to go through the nodes of the respective document 
in their own preferred order (Lemke 2002). The freedom to do this can increase 
understanding and also keep the reader engaged. A rigidly predetermined static path is 
a natural attention turnoff, whereas a series of choices that guide the recipient through 
the maze of a disclosure document is much more likely to prove stimulating and 
attractive enough to keep the reader moving through the text and actively acquiring 
the information it contains. Using hyperlinks within a disclosure document and the 
resulting customized reading paths should not be misinterpreted as infractions against 
the above-mentioned CJEU’s ruling. After all, we are talking about situations where 
hyperlinks are used by traders to facilitate consumers’ readership. Furthermore, 
consumers’ attention is not only clearly drawn to the information that hyperlinks 
contain, but there is also potential for enhanced attention being paid as a result of 
consumers’ ability to receive information in the fashion they find most amenable. This 
is the opposite of the intention behind the trader’s use of hyperlinks in the Content 
Services case.  
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In a study of self-directed digital learning by Phillips (2016), students 
unanimously report satisfaction with being able to follow their own personalized 
learning pathways and with the processes of custom reading and learning 
environments that are easy to navigate. In a further study that addresses the high 
dropout rates in online courses (MOOCs), Henning et al. (2014) explore student 
retention strategies and recommend establishing a fixed number of predefined 
learning pathways enhanced with semantic annotations – something which thoughtful 
hyperlinking within a document can effectively approximate. Grant and Basye (2014, 
p. 1) observe that digitally supported self-directed learning affords learners “more 
control over, a sense of ownership of, and accountability for the learning 
methodologies” of their choice, resulting in greater engagement and improved 
knowledge acquisition. In sum, empirical results provide an alternative, positive view 
of affording consumers certain freedoms as they peruse online disclosures. 
 
4.2. (Critical) Linguistics 
 
The language used in disclosures has crucial effects on their understandability and 
comprehensiveness. Convoluted sentence structure, extensive use of legal jargon and 
a general tendency towards prohibitively high reading levels (i.e., advanced 
vocabulary, grammatical and syntactical choices) have plagued disclosure texts for 
decades (Bakos et al. 2014; Marotta-Wurgler 2012; Milne and Culnan 2004). 
Empirical studies on the subject have uncovered a disheartening status quo, reviewed 
below. Furthermore, critical linguistics (e.g., Pollach 2005) identifies important ways 
in which grammar and syntax muddle responsibility, assign agency, and create 
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various degrees of rapport with the reader to produce variable levels of 
comprehension, trust and truthful communication. 
Literacy, in its textual (e.g., Ben-Shahar and Schneider 2014a; Luke 1989), 
financial (e.g., Ben-Shahar and Schneider 2014b; Mak 2012) and media (e.g., 
Livingstone 2004) varieties, is a major determinant of the success of information 
duties as a regulatory mechanism. Unfortunately, it is becoming clear that most 
information provided to consumers poses significant challenges to understanding 
because it does not match its recipients’ reading and comprehension abilities. Such 
information, therefore, not only fails to fulfil its primary purpose of informing and 
empowering consumers but also does not truly comply with EU consumer law, in that 
it avoids meeting the standards of clarity and comprehensibility put forth in directive 
after directive. Whilst there is no way to completely circumvent some of the 
terminology a comprehensive information text must contain (simplifying language 
excessively can, in fact, impair understanding – see, for example, Ben-Shahar and 
Schneider 2014a, Chapter 9), the grammatical and syntactic choices surrounding that 
terminology can easily be geared towards brevity and simplicity, without 
compromising on the content of information. Elshout et al. (2016) demonstrate the 
positive effects of meaningful and reasonable simplification: Consumers understand 
and retain the disclosed information better and also report higher satisfaction with 
shorter, simpler terms and conditions. Notably, shortening (i.e., eliminating 
information) does not diminish trust, which suggests that readers attach greater value 
to understandability than to exhaustiveness. 
Diving deeper into sentence structure and word choices, we quickly find that 
they are relevant to disclosure comprehension not only with regard to complexity. As 
Pollach (2005) demonstrates, the phrasing of privacy notices and other customer-
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oriented texts affects understanding in more ways than one. The way a notice is 
constructed syntactically and grammatically establishes social relationships of power 
and agency. Moreover, it guides the reader’s thought processes (i.e., inferences and 
deductions about what has been read) both while they are reading the document and 
afterwards. These language effects can be used both to clarify and to obfuscate the 
processes of personal data handling, and they are hard, if not impossible, to regulate 
effectively. It is, therefore, crucial to consider them more closely with respect to 
improving information obligations.  
Fowler (1985) provides a useful checklist for examining a document from the 
critical linguistic perspective, focussing on lexical processes, transitivity, syntactical 
transformations, modality, speech acts, implicature and personal addresses and 
references. All these elements relate back to earlier work in critical discourse analysis, 
such as Fowler and Kress (1979), Halliday (1978), and Kress (1985). Further, they 
have remained prominent in later, more systematic accounts of the method (see, for 
example, Wodak and Meyer 2009). In a nutshell, critical discourse analysis posits that 
language, and especially grammatical forms, allow text producers to influence, inform 
or deceive their readers because with the variety of available expressions it is possible 
to construct distinct (and highly subjective) representations of reality. Using Fowler’s 
(1985) checklist above, Pollach (2005) found that a sample of privacy notices 
employed by 28 online retailers and travel agencies frequently used obfuscating 
strategies in their handling of private information, usually by depriving readers of 
their agency and employing a large amount of modal verb constructions (such as may, 
might, could, etc.), rhetorical questions and persuasive appeals to common practice or 
fear. All of these deliberate choices of language work as sophisticated techniques used 
28  
by many retailers to present privacy notices in such a way that consumer doubt and 
dissent are minimized. 
The above review suggests that the road to better provision of information 
requires serious consideration of the use of language – not only from the traditional 
angles of reading levels or brevity, which have been discussed frequently in the 
literature. Specific grammatical choices such as passive voice, nominalization and 
personal reference modify understanding and can impart a false sense of security, 
detachment, irregularity, responsibility, or powerlessness when it comes to consumers 
reading (pre-)contractual information. Regulation of information obligations should, 
therefore, address at least those language practices that are highly likely to mislead, so 
that it can improve disclosures and allow them to serve their purposes better. 
 
4.3. Eye-Tracking Research and Neuroscience 
 
Neuroscientific studies of text perception can lend a helping hand in designing and 
testing new, better formats for provision of information. Eye-tracking research can 
both shed light on the existence of the average, reasonably well-informed and 
circumspect consumer – and explore the usefulness of this concept as a starting point 
for drafting regulations. In a study of how novices and experts read a multimedia 
presentation, Bucher and Niemann (2012) found that less informed recipients spent 
significantly more time jumping across different areas of the projected text, indicating 
impeded understanding and a less structured perception process. Such studies point 
towards the potential negative effects of formulating disclosure with a relatively 
sophisticated reader in mind. Whilst the costs and pitfalls of simplifying disclosures or 
educating the general public to read them in their present form cannot be denied, 
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continuing on the old path and leaving the vast majority of consumers who read 
disclosures confused and frustrated is similarly costly. 
The study above is part of a larger strand of research built around cognitive load 
theory (Sweller 1988). For this particular example, we can invoke one aspect of it, 
namely the expertise reversal effect (e.g., Kalyuga et al. 2003), which postulates that 
novice learners benefit from close guidance, while more advanced learners (i.e., 
“experts”), on the contrary, thrive when faced with less detailed instructions. Since 
reading (pre-)contractual information is essentially a learning task, matching content 
with ability is essential to successful knowledge acquisition. Eye-tracking studies such 
as the ones by Bucher and Niemann (2012) aptly demonstrate the detrimental effects 
of the mismatch between content and expertise. 
Another area where eye tracking can help make information more accessible 
and effective is information design, which is also directly linked to cognitive load 
theory. Holsanova and colleagues have spent some time investigating information 
design principles and their findings have a direct bearing on the case of information 
obligations. In their studies on the content-organisational principles of spatial 
contiguity and dual scripting (e.g., Holsanova et al. 2009; see also Johnson and Mayer 
2012), the authors have repeatedly reported that keeping similarly themed content in 
direct mutual proximity (i.e., spatial contiguity design) enhances understanding and 
retention and reduces cognitive load, while spacing such content out through different 
sections of a document (i.e., split attention design) has the opposite effects. Although 
this may sound like a truism, these findings confirm empirically what many would 
deduce intuitively: Properly compartmentalized information is easier to understand 
and retain. Despite this, some disclosure documents blatantly break with the good 
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practice of spatial contiguity and resort to splitting readers’ attention, thereby making 
the already dense material even harder to grasp. 
Neuroscientific studies thus provide further empirical evidence for what 
disclosure scholars have suspected for some time: There is little support for a one-
size-fits-all approach to drafting disclosures, and the organization of content within 
these texts must follow a coherent thematic structure. The former claim is somewhat 
of a thorny subject in the field, as it fundamentally opposes the existence of 
standardized and harmonized information obligations. Conversely, this finding could 
also lead to information obligations being drafted in a few versions, e.g., depending 
on the benchmark of consumer they would be addressing – average or vulnerable, 
expert or novice, and so on. The latter claim, nevertheless, can be incorporated more 
easily into existing information obligations and would require minimal effort to 
remedy a significant shortcoming – whether this requirement was adopted by 
policymakers or voluntarily applied by traders. 
 
4.4. Audience Studies and Expert Interviews 
 
Consider this apt observation: “Disclosers find that human situations are trickier than 
lawmakers anticipate” (Ben-Shahar and Schneider 2014a, p. 228). Shifting the focus 
away from the information’s content and presentation, empirical research should also 
consider human subjects and their interactions with the mechanism. Studies of 
consumers’ reading habits (e.g., Elshout et al. 2016; Furnell and Phippen 2012; 
Gallup Consortium 2013), relevant literacy (e.g., Mak 2012), and the extent to which 
the provided information has an impact on decision-making (e.g., Franken 2009; 
Himmelsbach et al. 2014; Leenheer et al. 2014; London Economics 2013; O’Shea 
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2008) are in apparent agreement that contract terms are forbiddingly complex and 
inaccessible, mainly due to their length and convoluted language. While these 
findings appear to have universal validity, they also do very little to provide traders 
drafting (pre-)contractual information with actionable insights. Here, findings from 
media audience studies as well as targeted expert interviews can greatly assist 
empirical legal studies to further understand what is effective (and ineffective) with 
respect to the ways in which traders disclose information, consumers read said 
information, and legal professionals evaluate both processes. Previous efforts in this 
area (Elshout et al. 2016; Hirschprung et al. 2016; Homburg and Stebel 2008; van 
Boom et al. 2016) have substantiated our understanding of consumers’ distaste for the 
status quo regarding the provision of information and also offered some concrete dos 
and don’ts for drafting more comprehensible documents. An empirical drive initiated 
by the European Commission (e.g., Van Roy et al. 2015) has tackled the problem 
exclusively from the perspective of behavioural economics, leaving approaches that 
focus on media content and media reception out of the equation – a serious omission 
which we seek to remedy. 
Qualitative interviews (e.g., Brinkmann 2014; Schreier 2012) are one particular 
method of collecting data whose potential for generating insights has not been tapped 
sufficiently. Lacko and Pappalardo (2010) set a good example in the field of studying 
mortgage disclosures and how consumers characterize them in conversation. A 
challenge here is that in-depth conversations with subjects are notoriously “a messy 
and slippery business” (Lewis 1991, p. 73). Part of this inherent messiness is that 
statements from consumers and legislators are often used anecdotally, but are rarely 
collected in a systematic way and with specific learning goals in mind (Linos and 
Carlson 2017). Recalling the idea that language has the capacity to construct social 
32  
realities and define relations of power, agency and transitivity (Halliday 1978) can 
help us appreciate that the way consumers, legislators and legal professionals talk 
about and interpret information obligations can further inform us about how the 
mechanism is applied in real-life situations. Media scholars have also increased their 
efforts to make the most out of qualitative interview data in the media reception 
context, and their insights have been directly applied to the understanding and 
evaluation of information provision. Schrøder’s (2000) six-dimensional model for 
evaluating audience discourses moves away from the simplistic encoding-decoding 
interpretation (Dahlgren 1998) that dominated media discourse studies. A heightened 
awareness of differing readings and implications (Schrøder 2000, p. 243) anchors 
analysis and clarifies the contexts of both the interviewee and the interviewer. This 
makes it possible to obtain a clearer and more objective insight into interviewees’ 
motivations for engaging with the text (in our case texts on information obligations), 
their ideological stance on it and their levels of engagement with it. To that end, 
Jansen (2002) adds a variety of applicable qualitative methodologies, including not 
only interviewing, but also observation, which has seen limited use in the field of 
policy evaluation. 
 
5. From Disciplinary Insights to Empirically Tested Policy Recommendations 
 
The overview of insights gained by different disciplines into the kind of content and 
presentation that make communication effective provides some useful directions for 
future empirical research and policy recommendations concerning information 
obligations. In this section, we summarize the relevant findings and propose directions 
for achieving particular policy goals, such as increasing the effectiveness of 
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information obligations, lowering the cost of information provision, and increasing 
the share of informed consumers in the general population, to name a few. We break 
down the task of conducting empirical research on information obligations into 
several sections that correspond to the problematic areas commonly identified in the 
literature and place particular emphasis on the discussion of the employed 
methodological approaches. We summarize these approaches as well as their realistic 
expansions and improvements in Table 1.  
The recommendations that follow may evoke parallels to other scholarly calls 
for simplifying information provision. They may also seem repetitive and effete in 
light of Ben-Shahar and Chilton’s (2016) recent experimental study, which 
demonstrated that commonly applied best practices fail to produce understandable 
long-form disclosure, and radical simplification down to a few key bullet points is not 
helpful, either. Still, it is important to note here that the best practices the authors 
tested were largely developed and implemented under the imperfect, non-empirical 
conditions we have described above. Furthermore, the disciplinary basis of those best 
practices is decidedly narrower – and thus less comprehensive – than what we propose 
here.  
 
Table 1 How can we expand and enhance traditional empirical approaches to 
studying online information obligations?  
 
Status Quo of 
Empirical 
Research  
Current 
Empirical 
Domain  
(see also Fig. 1) 
(Trans)Disciplinary 
Recommendations 
Further 
Elaboration 
Content analysis  Mainly within 
the domain of 
Critical linguistics 
Advanced content analysis 
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basic 
quantitative 
research  
(e.g., correspondence 
analysis; semi-automated 
corpus analysis, etc.) 
Discourse analysis 
Qualitative analysis 
Information design 
 
 
 
Sections 5.1, 5.2 
Survey Mainly within 
the domain of 
basic consumer 
research  
Triangulation with:  
Qualitative interviews 
Participant observation 
 
Sections 5.3, 5.4 
Behavioural 
experiments  
Mainly within 
the domain of 
behavioural 
economics  
Empirically motivated 
document revisions 
Eye tracking 
A/B Testing 
Media reception studies  
 
Sections 5.1, 
5.2, 5.3 
Note: The current empirical study of online information obligations remains largely 
on the surface, grounded in two empirical domains, with methodologies of basic 
content analyses, stand-alone users’ surveys, and behavioural experiments whose 
conditions often lack empirical motivation. We propose enhancements to each of these 
approaches with specialized methodologies from the same and/or neighbouring 
disciplines in order to gather deeper, more robust insights into the form, content, 
reception, and effects of online disclosures. Further elaboration can be found in the 
respective subsections.  
 
As evident from the general overview, our main proposal is that the solid 
empirical work that is starting to grow in the search for improved mandatory 
information obligations should be enhanced with additional multidisciplinary 
methodological resources. The enhancements concern four broad areas related to the 
implementation of information obligations, i.e., content, presentation, 
comprehensibility, and the human element in these areas. 
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5.1. Content of Information 
 
While the content of information (texts couched in legal language, convoluted 
sentence structures, obfuscating linguistic choices) has been heavily criticized, few 
studies have offered a systematic breakdown of the problems and empirically 
motivated remedies. An international comparison of online disclosures can reveal 
recurrent issues as well as national-, European-, or business sector-specific aberrations 
in the application of EU directives and national legislation. A corpus of online 
standard contract terms, privacy statements and cookie policies can be submitted to 
automated or semi-automated critical linguistic analysis in order to ascertain instances 
of modality, transitivity, nominalisation, passive voice, and other grammatical and 
rhetorical strategies which obfuscate information and reduce transparency (see, for 
example, Micklitz et al. 2017). Should significant levels of obfuscating language be 
found, policy recommendations against the excessive use of modal verbs, passive 
voice, or nominalized process descriptions must be formulated. Their implementation 
will not be costly or complicated, and their effects for increasing consumer protection 
promise to be positive and far-reaching, as recent empirical research (such as Elshout 
et al. 2016) strongly suggests. 
Another aspect of the information’s content which merits empirical attention is 
how compact or diffuse similar concepts are, i.e., are readers required to split their 
attention and join the dots themselves, or are terms which deal with the same or 
related legal situations presented in close mutual proximity? This feature of the 
information corpus can also be mapped automatically, and an obligation to reorganize 
the content of information is very likely to be low-cost and high-yield. 
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5.2. Format of Information 
 
The presentation of information has also been clearly identified as a potential burden 
for consumers. The lack of attention guidance beyond simple headings and the 
occasional use of all-caps is a problem. Conversely, the opposite extreme is just as 
bad, i.e., the overuse of divergent attention guidance in the form of multiple coloured 
fonts or many different font types (for the example of the California “bed sheet”, see 
Ben-Shahar and Schneider 2014a, p. 23). The implementation of meaningful attention 
guidance strategies can be ascertained via a semi-automated or manual content 
analysis of the information corpus. Instances of excessive and counterproductive, 
overly complex layout can be mitigated by instituting a cap on font types, sizes, and 
colours. Attention guidance, furthermore, should not be motivated by anecdotal 
evidence or common sense alone; instead, both empirical media research and 
neuroscientific studies should be used to guide decisions in this realm. 
Hyperlinks are the other formatting feature of the online provision of 
information. Meaningful hyperlinking can support understanding, learning, and 
retention. Moreover, the amount of internal and external links can reveal the 
document’s structure, communicative goals and information efficiency. Hyperlinking 
can also be mapped automatically in a corpus analysis, and recommendations for its 
apt internal and sparing external application are easily attainable once it is ascertained 
that using such a mechanism to the benefit of consumers is approved under European 
consumer law. 
 
5.3. Devices and Understandability 
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The type of device on which information is presented plays a major role in 
consumers’ engagement with it. Although responsive design is the norm in modern 
web design, some tweaks may be required with specific devices and screen 
dimensions in mind in order to transfer effective content and presentation formats to 
all common presentation views. The reduction in immediately perceivable layout 
hierarchy and structure as text is moved to ever more compact screens greatly reduces 
readability as well as reader motivation. Experimental designs intended for different 
devices and with different information formats can be used to ascertain the extent of 
communicative efficiency lost between different screen sizes and layout granularity. 
These can be complemented by surveys and interviews to gain additional insight. 
Hands-on interaction with the text is also an aspect of understandability. The 
importance of being able to highlight passages or take notes can be explored in the 
experimental design by allowing a group of participants to mark up the texts they read 
and then testing whether this improves understanding and retention. The 
implementation of such a finding remains limited for the time being since not every 
device can support text mark-up and margin notes. This technical barrier 
notwithstanding, further empirical proof of the effects of empowering the reader to 
engage with the text much more closely will inform future information presentation 
formats. 
 
5.4. Authors, Recipients, and Interpreters of Information 
 
Much empirical legal research focuses on legal provisions such as directives and 
regulations, and the information obligations contained in them, but there has been 
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little meaningful empirical analysis of how legislators create and interpret those legal 
provisions, how traders apply and develop information obligations (with some notable 
exceptions, see Loewenstein et al. 2014), and how consumers interact with the 
provided information (apart from the general consensus that they tend not to). Expert 
interviews with legal professionals can be an initial step towards remedying this 
deficit. Such interviews should focus on the motivations for specific regulations, how 
it is intended that they should be implemented, and how their practice is to be 
evaluated, in terms of specific cases and their resolution. A quantitative amendment to 
the expert interviews could provide valuable context on each expert, resulting in a 
data bank of professionals with expertise as to information obligations, who can also 
be involved in later studies.  
The reception side of information obligations can provide more actionable 
insights than previously attainable through large-N online survey designs. These 
would concentrate on practical tasks and on the testing of different information 
formats developed according to empirically verified principles, some of which have 
already been identified in previous sections of this paper. This design minimizes self-
reporting and focuses on real reader-text interaction, which promises richer and more 
reliable insights that can, in turn, lead to more effective and far-reaching policy 
recommendations. 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
In the past decades, the European Commission has followed an international trend and 
passed legislation that requires traders to disclose an ever-growing amount of 
transaction-specific information in order to, among other things, address transactional 
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information asymmetry. While they are well-intentioned, some recent research 
suggests that it is, at best, unclear whether current information obligation practices 
achieve their purposes. At worst, excessive disclosure requirements may even have a 
detrimental effect as they do little to educate and empower but create compliance 
costs for traders that in competitive markets will be passed on to consumers. 
We have indicated the inconsistencies of the current legislative practice of either 
drafting very general requirements for transparent disclosures or specifying them in 
detail for isolated consumer protection issues. According to our argument, the 
effectiveness of mandatory information obligations can only be improved if more 
scientifically sound, empirical data on consumer behaviour are taken into 
consideration. As a first step towards filling this knowledge gap, we have carried out a 
systematic, structured, and objective review of relevant studies from disciplines such 
as communication science, linguistics, neuroscience, cognitive sciences, and the social 
sciences. Our multidisciplinary review has led to the identification of empirically 
verified principles that can be used to improve the design and implementation of 
information obligations; whether to further guide policymakers where transparency 
requirements have not yet been given a specific form or to serve as a benchmark 
against which the already existing specific information designs could be tested. The 
below-mentioned principles should, of course, be further verified in empirical 
research, testing their applicability specifically in mandatory information obligations 
provided to consumers online.  
To begin with, eye-tracking and neuroscience research found that novice users 
need more guidance and detailed information in order to learn, while experts need 
freedom to choose their own learning pathways and pace. We propose, therefore, to 
further examine test findings in the area of mandatory information obligations. This 
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could lead to the necessity to provide information in both “novice” and “expert” 
versions, in which details can be either shown or hidden. 
In regard to the overall appearance of information, communication science and 
information design apprise us that complex information should have a specific layout 
with a clear hierarchy of headings and subheadings, as well as different fonts to 
emphasize important concepts and passages. To avoid overwhelming the consumer, 
there should be a limit to how many different emphases can be used in a single 
document. In future empirical research, the impact of such changes to the layout of 
lengthy terms and conditions disclosing mandatory information should be assessed.  
The same disciplines emphasize the value of internal hyperlinking, which could 
be used to make the connections between important concepts apparent and help 
familiarize consumers with them. This should also allow consumers to follow their 
own reading pathways, so that they can learn in a more personalized way. Pop-up or 
mouse-over definitions of legal terms and other professional jargon should be added 
to ensure that consumers understand the terminology. Similar topics, concepts and 
themes should appear next to each other to make it easier for consumers to draw 
connections between concepts and reduce cognitive strain. This is another area that 
will nevertheless require further empirical research, especially since the use of 
hyperlinks by online traders has been deemed detrimental to consumers so far, as 
evidenced in the Content Services case. 
In regard to the language employed, critical linguistics teaches us that 
disclosures should feature short and simple sentences wherever possible, to match the 
reading and comprehension abilities of the general population. Terminology should 
not be rephrased or simplified, but grammar and syntax should be revised to 
maximize understanding. Excessive use of modal verbs, hazy frequency adverbs, 
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rhetorical questions, personification, and the passive voice are all obfuscating 
linguistic strategies that make it harder for consumers to gain knowledge. These 
practices should be substituted by straightforward statements in the active voice, with 
concrete frequency indicators and clearly established agency and responsibility. 
Whilst some empirical research has already been conducted on the impact of 
simplifying and shortening mandatory information, we suggest an increase in the 
amount of experiments conducted in order to obtain more reliable and convincing 
results.  
In this paper we have argued that our research results can only be a very first 
step towards improving online provision of mandatory consumer information. More 
specific empirical research is required on content, presentation, understandability, and 
the human element therein. According to our analysis, these areas can only be 
adequately investigated by employing multidisciplinary methodological approaches. 
Therefore, we have provided detailed suggestions for suitable research designs. We 
expect that research carried out along these lines will contribute further towards 
improving this important policy instrument. 
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